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Abstract 
 
Despite the pervasiveness of digital disinformation in society, little is known about the individual 
characteristics that make some users more susceptible to erroneous information uptake than 
others, effectively dividing the media audience into prone and resistant groups. This study 
identifies and tests procedural news knowledge as a consequential civic resource with the 
capacity to inoculate audiences from disinformation and close this “resistance gap.” Engaging 
the persuasion knowledge model, the study utilizes data from two national surveys to 
demonstrate that possessing working knowledge of how the news media operate aids in the 
identification and effects of fabricated news and native advertising. 
 
Keywords: fake news; inoculation theory; native advertising; persuasion knowledge 
model; procedural news knowledge  
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Conferring Resistance to Digital Disinformation:  
The Inoculating Influence of Procedural News Knowledge 
Although not new, “fake news” exploded into the popular lexicon in 2016, most 
prominently during the US presidential election and also in connection with the Brexit 
referendum in the UK. Between January 2014 and January 2016, there was a 1,100% increase in 
the number of traceable online fabricated news stories, from approximately 500 to over 6,000 
stories per month (Vargo, Guo, & Amazeen, 2018). Suffice it to say, digital disinformation is 
now pervasive in society; however, little is known about the individual characteristics of news 
consumers that make some users more susceptible to erroneous information uptake than others, 
effectively dividing the media audience into prone and resistant groups. Given that industry 
experts, journalists, and even members of the scientific community have difficulty identifying 
suspect content from authentic information (see Bohannon, 2015), how can the average citizen 
be expected to decipher fact from fiction?  
To address this question, we identify and test a consequential civic resource called 
procedural news knowledge (PNK), which has the capacity to inoculate audiences from 
disinformation and close this “resistance gap.” We use inoculation theory (McGuire, 1964) and 
the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad & Wright, 1994) to examine how a more advanced 
understanding of the news may confer resistance to mediated disinformation efforts (McGrew, 
Ortega, Breakstone, & Wineburg, 2017). The study utilizes data from two national surveys to 
demonstrate how PNK not only serves as an antecedent to recognition of disinformation but also 
how it affects consequent coping responses. The analysis shows that possessing working 
knowledge of how the news media operate aids in the identification of fabricated news headlines 
and in mitigating the effects of native advertising, including liking, sharing, and 
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misunderstanding suspect content. Findings from the study extend the persuasion knowledge 
model by explicating the contributions of an important informational difference that facilitates 
recognition of covert persuasion as well as identifying coping mechanisms that define 
inoculation-induced resistance to disinformation. 
“Fake News” or Disinformation? 
The term “fake news” has been used and misused so frequently that its precise meaning 
has become muddled, depending on the context in which it is invoked (see Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 
2018). President Donald Trump wields the term to single out news organizations that publish 
critical reports of his policies or administration, while popular press accounts use fake news to 
mean fabricated stories or manipulated news content (e.g., Politico, 2018; Subramanian, 2017). 
A review of the literature by Tandoc et al. (2018) identified numerous varieties of problematic 
content and varying motivations for its creation and dissemination that align with work on 
deception more generally (Jackson & Jamieson, 2007). Fake news encompasses satirical news, 
news parody, news fabrication, photo manipulation, advertising that imitates news, and 
propaganda (Tandoc et al., 2018). However, although currently a trending term, “fake news” is 
not news. Thus, various groups recommend abandoning its use altogether and specifying 
“disinformation” instead (see European Commission, 2018; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). In this 
paper, we heed this recommendation and focus on two increasingly common types of 
disinformation used to deceive consumers: fabricated political news and native advertising 
within a digital news context. 
 Fabricated news stories are intentionally deceptive, contain little to no facticity, and may 
be driven by political motivations as well as financial incentives (Tandoc et al., 2018). During 
elections, fabricated news stories can take on the ugly cast of direct character attacks, but in the 
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guise of news. Some of the more notorious examples of disinformation from the 2016 US 
presidential election, for instance, implicated Hillary Clinton in breaking electoral laws, running 
a child sex ring out of a popular pizza parlor in Washington, DC, and selling weapons to the 
terrorist group ISIS (Holan, 2016). Such fabricated claims not only cast a dark cloud over the 
target’s character but also pit voters who accept the information as true against those who are 
enraged by its creation and promulgation. Similar attempts to exacerbate political tensions and 
sow division surround false reports over “rigged” elections and attempts at voter suppression—a 
tactic used in the 2018 midterm elections (Lopez, 2018). The political consequences of this type 
of disinformation, then, can be highly corrosive.  
In the sense that it is also deliberately deceptive, the practice of native advertising follows 
suit, particularly in online news environments. Native advertising is a type of covert marketing 
where an ad mimics—or seems “native” to—the platform on which it appears. While fabricated 
news stories are not based in fact, native advertisements are rooted in reality but obscure the bias 
and one-sidedness of the message. An evolution of the print advertorials of the analog era, native 
advertising has proliferated in the digital era (Einstein, 2016), appropriating the “look and feel of 
real news” (Tandoc et al., 2018, p. 147). Many legacy and digital-only news media not only host 
native advertising but create such content on behalf of advertisers (Gerth, 2017). While good for 
generating revenue, this trend has not been good for informed citizenship. A growing body of 
research reveals that when native ads appear on news websites, less than 1 in 4 adults are able to 
identify that what they are viewing is an advertisement rather than news content (Amazeen & 
Wojdynski, 2018; Wojdynski & Evans, 2016). Moreover, legitimate news sites that mask or 
make it difficult to determine the origin of their sponsored content contribute to audience 
perceptions of a “fake news” problem (Bradley, 2017). 
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Although native advertising often has the goal of creating favorable attitudes to increase 
sales of consumer products, the practice has also been used in political contexts. Iversen and 
Knudsen (2017) demonstrate how the use of native advertisements by political candidates in 
Norway reduced audience trust in political news. In the US, the digital-only news site, Politico, 
has recently taken a stand against misleading content by “undertaking an ambitious effort to 
identify and trace the origins of political disinformation and debunk it” (Politico Staff, 2018). 
However, Politico was identified as creating one of the most effective ads for Cambridge 
Analytica (the data mining company that took credit for delivering the White House to Donald 
Trump via its use of microtargeting) during the 2016 US presidential election: a native 
advertisement that listed “10 inconvenient truths about the Clinton Foundation” (Lewis & Hilder, 
2018). Thus, seemingly legitimate news sources such as Politico often go to bat for their political 
advertisers (Wemple, 2013). In such confusing information spaces, the capacity to suss out 
legitimate news from commercial and political interests is arguably more important, and 
difficult, than ever—and is fast-becoming an important resource for effective citizenship. 
Knowledge as an Inoculating Influence 
Persuasion knowledge. The persuasion knowledge model (Friestad & Wright, 1994) 
offers a useful theoretical framework to understand how individuals recognize and process 
messages intended to influence. According to the model, persuasive attempts are affected by an 
individual’s knowledge in three areas—persuasion, agent, and topic—as well as by individual 
characteristics and message components (Friestad & Wright, 1994). For someone to be in a 
position to respond to a persuasive attempt, recognition of the persuasive episode must first 
occur. In the case of native advertising, the covert nature of native ads may make it difficult for 
individuals to recognize their persuasive intent and therefore draw from relevant cognitive 
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structures to effectively interpret their meaning (Amazeen & Wojdynski, 2018). Similarly, the 
resemblance of fabricated news to real news—in both format and content that appears 
believable—also makes persuasive recognition difficult. 
Besides relying upon knowledge of what constitutes persuasion, individuals draw upon 
agent knowledge—the perceived characteristics, competencies, and objectives of the message 
communicator (Friestad & Wright, 1994). In the case of native advertising, the agent may be a 
mainstream news organization (Einstein, 2016). Traditionally, journalistic norms have dictated a 
separation between the business side of publishing (advertising) and the editorial content of 
journalism where one was not supposed to influence the other. However, a significant erosion of 
that separation in recent years (Gerth, 2017) means audiences are now confronted with content 
that appears to be journalistic in nature but is actually advertising, as when The New York Times 
published a piece on female incarceration that was really an ad for the Netflix series, “Orange Is 
the New Black” (Einstein, 2016). Thus, the evolving nature of online content likely affects how 
individuals are able to respond to what may appear to be information from a journalistic source 
or agent but is actually advertising.  
In the persuasion knowledge model, topic knowledge entails what an individual knows 
about the subject matter of a message, which influences product or brand attitudes (Friestad & 
Wright, 1994). In the context of factual reporting, we would expect individuals to draw upon 
their common sense understanding of what constitutes news, i.e., unsponsored, fact-based 
reporting about politics, international developments, business, or other topics of public interest. 
News coverage that appears to serve a particular interest is considered biased (Vallone, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1985), while heavily branded articles are perceived as promotional (Van Reijmersdal, 
Neijens, & Smit, 2010).  
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Because the knowledge structures of persuasion, agent, and topic are not necessarily 
distinct (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008), individuals may draw upon multiple structures when 
making sense of what appears to be a news message. For instance, if readers encounter a New 
York Times story about female incarceration and notice the small “paid post” disclosure and then 
decide to ignore the article on account of it, they are likely drawing upon topic knowledge that 
objective news is not paid for by sponsors and persuasion knowledge that paid posts constitute 
advertising. Thus, whether drawing from agent, topic, or persuasion knowledge structures, 
successfully navigating the contemporary media environment is an increasingly complex task 
that requires a schema or cognitive framework for news to avoid manipulation.  
Procedural news knowledge. Contextual factors that influence message processing have 
received considerable attention in research that uses the persuasion knowledge model. A 
promising area of model expansion includes the contributions of dispositional factors that serve 
as antecedents to persuasion recognition (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008). In the case of suspect 
digital content, the degree to which an individual understands how mainstream news 
organizations operate, for example, should facilitate their ability to parse news-related content 
from imposter content. Among other things, news literacy fosters an understanding of the vital 
role that news plays in society, the ability to identify or recognize what qualifies as news, and the 
capacity to critically assess information (Malik et al., 2013).  
Empirical studies have demonstrated that those with higher levels of news media literacy 
know more about current events (Ashley, Maksl, & Craft, 2017) and are better able to critically 
evaluate news content (Vraga & Tully, 2016), as well as correctly judge the accuracy of online 
political posts (Kahne & Bowyer, 2017), than those lower in literacy. News literacy is also 
associated with a decreased likelihood of believing in online conspiracy theories (Craft, Ashley, 
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& Maksl, 2017) and correlates with a firm understanding of media industries, content, and 
effects (Maksl, Ashley, & Craft, 2015). Indeed, a vital element of news media literacy includes a 
developed understanding of professional news operations and procedures, which we call 
procedural news knowledge (PNK).  
Though newly relevant in the era of digital disinformation, knowledge about mainstream 
media was identified in earlier research as a key determinant of story comprehension, 
perceptions of media credibility, and channel choice (see Robinson & Kohut, 1988; Robinson & 
Levy, 1986). In their studies of learning from television news, Robinson and Levy (1986) found 
news knowledge to have more predictive value than education, self-reported media use, and 
motivations for viewing in explaining news story comprehension. Becker, Whitney, and Collins 
(1980) also argued that public understanding of how the news media operate was a critical 
component of civic engagement and democratic participation.  
Just as political sophisticates draw on an elaborated understanding of politics that 
facilitates the integration of new political information and organizes relationships among related 
concepts (Luskin, 1990), so a sophisticated understanding of the news should facilitate 
categorization of legitimate reports from false accounts. Because sophistication is characterized 
by cognitive complexity and domain expertise (Luskin, 1990), news experts—i.e., those who 
score high in PNK—should have more stored knowledge about what legitimate news production 
and reporting entails than non-experts and should be able to call on this knowledge when 
confronted with questionable information. In marshalling their expertise, news experts are more 
likely to accurately identify (and reject) fabricated news stories, articulate their rationale for 
doing so, and have more reasons for rejecting false information than non-experts. Therefore, we 
predict that: 
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H1: Higher levels of procedural news knowledge will improve the likelihood of 
accurately recognizing digital disinformation, including a) native advertising and b) 
fabricated news headlines. 
Inoculation theory. Upon recognition of an attempt at influence, the persuasion 
knowledge model theorizes that individuals will employ coping mechanisms affecting both 
cognition and behavior (Friestad & Wright, 1994). Although coping responses are another 
understudied area of the persuasion knowledge model (Campbell & Kirmani, 2008), the 
literature shows that individuals often respond to persuasive attempts with resistance (Jacks & 
Cameron, 2003). Similarly, an implicit theoretical foundation underpinning media literacy is 
inoculation theory, which suggests that individuals can be informationally immunized from 
media-driven pressures to consume particular products or adopt certain behaviors (Eagle, 2007). 
Drawn from a medical analogy, inoculation theory (McGuire, 1964) would predict in the case of 
digital disinformation that, just as pre-exposure to a weakened virus can confer resistance to 
future viral attacks, so those with pre-existing news media literacy skills should be better able to 
recognize imposter content when confronted with it and reject its appeal.  
A crucial mechanism in inoculation-induced resistance to influence is threat perception 
(Compton & Ivanov, 2012). Threat is defined as the recognition that one’s beliefs may be 
vulnerable to forthcoming attacks (McGuire, 1964). Although early inoculation researchers 
assumed the presence of threat, studies have since demonstrated how and when threat matters. 
For instance, threat can be generated via explicit forewarnings that one’s position will be 
challenged. When followed by preemptive refutations (exposure to the type of arguments that 
will be used to attack one’s position, along with how to counterargue these attacks), resistance to 
influence is enhanced (Compton & Ivanov, 2012). However, the degree to which an explicit 
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warning can generate threat in the absence of refutational or supportive arguments has not been 
established. As internalized understanding of how the news media operate, PNK ought to foster 
resistance if high knowledge holders are warned about the presence of disinformation. 
Furthermore, if PNK implicitly confers resistance to fake information owing to top of mind 
awareness of legitimate news practices and institutional arrangements, then when faced with the 
prospect of confronting disinformation, those with higher levels of PNK should experience 
higher perceptions of threat. Thus, we predict that:  
H2: Higher levels of procedural news knowledge will be positively associated with 
native advertising threat perception. 
Exposure to preemptive refutations has also been shown to motivate the production of 
counterarguments not included in the original forewarning (Ivanov et al., 2015). Counterarguing 
involves generating statements that contest a promoted position, advance alternative positions, or 
challenge the validity of the message source. In the case of native advertising, counterarguments 
may involve challenging the validity of the message’s claims or derogating the publisher or 
message sponsor. If individuals are capable of generating unique counterarguments that both 
identify and rebut attacks (Compton & Ivanov, 2012), then motivated individuals (i.e., those with 
higher PNK) should be able to counterargue when simply warned about suspect content without 
the need for examples to guide their evaluation process. Moreover, since it is the accessibility of 
counterarguments that confer resistance (Miller & Baron, 1973), those most motivated to 
recognize fabricated content should also show a greater propensity to counterargue. On this 
basis, we predict that:  
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H3: When confronted with digital disinformation, news experts—individuals who have 
a broad base of procedural news knowledge—will offer more counterarguments 
than news novices. 
Furthermore, how an individual cognitively elaborates a response to a message can be 
integral to affecting whether persuasion or resistance occurs. Positive thoughts in line with 
message arguments generally foster persuasion, while thoughts tinged with negative polarity tend 
to generate resistance (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). Given that more counterarguing is predicted 
from those with high levels of PNK, it is expected that these same individuals will be less likely 
to exhibit behaviors consistent with persuasive effects. Therefore, we predict that: 
H4: Procedural news knowledge will have an inverse relationship with persuasion.  
Methods 
To address these predictions, the study utilizes data from two national online surveys 
conducted with US respondents. The first was carried out via an experiment administered 
between February 13 and 27, 2018. Participants were recruited by Survey Sampling International 
(SSI) from a sample balanced by age, gender, ethnicity, and US Census Region. Among the 770 
participants who completed the survey, the average age was 46, 56% were female, 67% 
identified as white, and 57% had at least some college education. The second survey was 
conducted between October 12 and 21, 2018 using the ProdegeMR market research panel, again 
within the US and balanced by demographics and place of residence. Among the 1,067 
participants who completed the survey, the median age range was 45 to 54 (age was measured 
categorically), 50% were female, 68% identified as white, and 48% had at least some college 
education. 
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Participants in the first sample were randomly assigned to view one of two native 
advertisements: one had public policy implications (a political condition) and the other did not (a 
non-political condition). The stimulus for the political condition was an article titled “A Complex 
Flow of Energy,” sponsored by Chevron involving global energy consumption (Aston, n.d.). The 
stimulus for the non-political condition was titled “Grit & Grace,” sponsored by Cole Haan about 
ballet dancers (T Brand Studio, n.d.). Both stimuli were authentic digital native advertisements 
created by the The New York Times’ T Brand Studio (see Figure 1) with interactive features (e.g., 
embedded videos and the ability to click on charts for more information). Stimulus ads were 
selected from a pretest of six articles that were rated for their hard versus soft news orientation as 
well as readers’ understanding of and interest in the content. This stimulus presentation follows 
other studies of native advertising recognition (Amazeen & Wojdynski, 2018; Wojdynski & 
Evans, 2016). 
-- Insert Figure 1 about here -- 
Our second test of procedural news knowledge as an inoculating influence assessed the 
ability of citizens to distinguish between fabricated and real political information. A series of 
five authentic and five made up political headlines were randomly presented to study 
participants, followed by three questions. First, participants were invited to rate the accuracy of 
the statements using a 4-point scale from “not at all accurate” to “very accurate.” They were then 
asked how likely they would be to “like” and “share” the story on social media, again using a 4-
point scale from “not at all likely” to “very likely.” They were informed: “Feel free to use the 
web to search for answers if you'd like.” No time limit was imposed for answering the questions. 
This approach was modified from Wineburg et al. (2016) in which participants searched to verify 
claims about various topics in tests of civic online reasoning.  
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Procedures 
Sample 1. Following informed consent, participants were first asked about their news 
habits, interests, motivations, and knowledge. As part of research beyond the scope of the present 
study, some participants were then primed with a message about media literacy. All participants 
were then asked about their familiarity with and perceived threat of encountering native 
advertising. Afterwards, participants were asked to view a webpage from The New York Times 
and were randomly exposed to one of the two native ad stimuli. This was immediately followed 
by a thought-listing question asking participants what they were thinking when viewing the page. 
After a distractor task, participants were asked about the presence of advertising, perceived intent 
of the article, the dependent persuasion measures, and demographic information.  
Sample 2. Participants were asked about their demographic information, news 
knowledge, interest in news and politics, political orientations, evaluations of political figures 
and parties, and fabricated news recognition. The fabricated headline recognition test was run as 
part of a larger experimental study about candidate fact-checks and political information veracity 
(not reported here). The news knowledge items were asked at the outset of the study, before the 
experimental stimuli, while the political news headline questions appeared at the very end. None 
of the experimental content overlapped with any of the news recognition headlines.     
Measures 
Procedural news knowledge. A composite measure of PNK was developed using items 
adapted from Robinson and Kohut (1988), Maksl et al. (2015), and the Reuters Digital News 
Report (Fletcher, 2018). PNK measures knowledge about the practices of institutions that 
produce news, editorial procedures that generate content, and distinctions between news 
gathering and advocacy. Unlike the knowledge structures dimension of Maksl et al.’s (2015) 
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news media literacy construct, the PNK measure does not assess one’s understanding of the 
possible effects of news content on audiences.1 The PNK measure included 10 multiple choice 
questions, each with one correct answer (see Appendix A). The composite measure was based on 
summing the correct number of responses to all 10 questions. Just 3% of respondents answered 
all 10 questions correctly, 27% answered eight or more correctly, and 73% answered at least half 
the items correctly (M = 5.90, SD = 2.26). 
A subset of four items measuring PNK was used in the second study. The list of 
questions was shorter than in the first study due to space limitations, a desire to match items 
across the two surveys, and test a condensed version of the index for use in future research given 
that survey time is costly and respondent attention limited (question wordings are available from 
the authors). The Reuters Digital News Report (Fletcher, 2018) also utilized a four-item news 
literacy question battery. The PNK measure again included multiple choice questions, each with 
one correct answer. All four PNK questions were correctly answered by 13% of participants, 3 
out of 4 questions were correctly answered by 32%, and 73% answered at least half the items 
correctly (M = 2.26, SD = 1.10). 
Recognition of native advertising. Following other studies of native advertising 
(Amazeen & Wojdynski, 2018; Wojdynski & Evans, 2016), the ability to distinguish editorial 
                                                      
1 We considered this a form of specialized knowledge that would require specific training in 
media education or research. By contrast, general knowledge about news practices and 
operations (i.e., PNK) typically develops informally through a process of media socialization and 
news exposure, without the need for specific training. Therefore, PNK is more likely to be 
evenly distributed throughout the population. 
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news content from commercial content was assessed using a two-step process. Participants were 
first asked whether they remembered seeing any advertising on the web page they just viewed. 
Affirmative responses (24%) were followed with a pair of open-ended questions asking for an 
explanation of where on the page they saw the stimulus ad as well as how they knew it was 
advertising. Responses were coded “1” for recognition of native advertising and “0” for lack of 
recognition. A pair of research assistants trained to identify answers that indicated recognition 
coded the responses independently (Krippendorff’s α = .88). Consistent with other academic 
research on native advertising recognition in digital news contexts (Amazeen & Wojdynski, 
2018), only 12% of participants identified the stimuli as sponsored, or commercial in nature. 
Perceived accuracy of news headlines. This measure represents the average accuracy 
score across the 5 false headlines and 5 true headlines (reverse coded) on a 4-point scale where 1 
= “not at all accurate” and 4 = “very accurate” (M = 2.23, SD = 0.45). See Appendix B for the 
headline wording.  
Perceived threat. Following standard procedures from the inoculation literature 
(Compton & Ivanov, 2012), perceived threat of being confronted with a hidden persuasive 
attempt was assessed by asking participants: “How do you feel about the idea that you may 
encounter native advertising in the future?” The perceived threat measure was calculated from 
six bipolar adjective pairs that utilized 7-point response scales: nonthreatening/threatening, 
harmful/not harmful (reverse coded), not dangerous/dangerous, risky/not risky (reverse coded), 
calm/anxious, and not scary/scary. Averaged together, they formed a composite measure of 
threat perception (Cronbach’s α = .90, M = 3.98, SD = 1.39), with a higher mean score 
representing greater perceived threat. 
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Counterarguing. Another dependent measure of resistance to disinformation, 
counterarguing in thought-listing questions (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981), was used to assess 
cognitive responses to the native advertising stimuli. Participants could list up to five comments 
about what they were thinking while viewing the native ad. Two trained research assistants 
independently coded the open-ended responses on polarity (Krippendorff’s α = .83). Unfavorable 
comments were those that were negative toward or challenged the validity of a referent (M = 
1.43, SD = 1.56), such as “Paid posts are biased” or “This isn’t an article, it’s an ad for 
Chevron.”  
Persuasion. Measures of persuasion, derived from Wojdynski and Evans (2016), 
included propensity to engage with the content on social media (for all participants) and purchase 
intent (only for participants exposed to the native advertising stimulus). Each item used a 7-point 
scale where 1 = “extremely unlikely” and 7 = “extremely likely.” Propensity to engage on social 
media is a composite measure based on two items: reported intention to “like” and share the 
native advertising article (Cronbach’s α = .93, M = 3.16, SD = 1.92). Purchase intent is also a 
composite measure encompassing likelihood of making a purchase from the native advertising 
article sponsor, either Chevron or Cole Haan, and likelihood of subscribing to The New York 
Times (α = .93, M = 3.20, SD = 1.77). These measures were combined to form an overall 
composite assessment of persuasion (α = .87, M = 3.18, SD = 1.74). A separate measure of 
persuasion was developed for participants exposed to the news headlines. This measure consisted 
of two items assessing propensity to engage on social media: reported intention to “like” and 
share the news headlines using a 4-point scale where 1 = “not at all likely” and 4 = “very likely” 
(α = .96, M = 1.78, SD = 0.81). 
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Control variables. Included in many of the analyses are controls for age (MS1 = 45.75, 
SDS1 = 16.41), gender (with female as the high value of 2, MS1 = 1.57, SDS1 = 0.50; MS2 = 1.50, 
SDS2 = 0.50), an education measure using an 8-point ordinal scale for sample 1 (MS1 = 3.54 
[roughly some college/no degree/associate’s degree], SDS1 = 3.00) and a 5-point ordinal scale for 
sample 2 (MS2 = 4.00 [college degree], SDS2 = 1.02), a 9-point ordinal measure of income (MS1 = 
4.25 [49% reported an annual household income of less than $50,000] SD = 4.00S1), and 
ideology (MS1 = 3.05, SDS1 = 1.07; MS2 = 3.13, SDS2 = 1.12), where 1 = “very liberal” and 5 = 
“very conservative.”  
Frequency of news consumption is based upon a 6-point ordinal scale, “How often do 
you seek out the news?” (1 = every day, 2 = 3-5 days per week, 3 = 1-2 days per week, 4 = once 
every few weeks, 5 = less often, and 6 = never). The measure is reverse-coded so that lower 
numbers represent less frequent news consumption (MS1 = 5.40, SDS1 = 1.02). Interest in news 
and politics is measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale where 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “very 
interested” (MS2 = 4.64, SDS2 = 1.80). Perceived credibility of The New York Times is also used 
as a control measure, assessed with a 7-point Likert-type scale where 1 = “less credible” and 7 = 
“more credible” (MS1 = 5.17, SDS1 = 1.79).  
In addition to these dispositional variables, controls are also used among sample 1 
participants for two situational factors: political vs. non-political native advertising exposure and 
whether participants were primed about media literacy (reported elsewhere). For sample 2 
participants exposed to news headlines, dummy variables were created to control for those who 
reported voting in the 2016 presidential election for either Clinton (37%), Trump (36%), or 
another candidate (7%). 
Results 
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The first set of hypotheses (H1) predicted that higher levels of PNK would be positively 
related to successfully identifying two types of disinformation: a) native advertising and b) 
fabricated news stories. To examine H1a, a binomial logistic regression was conducted using 
SPSS v.24. The first model specified native advertising recognition as the dependent variable 
(DV) and the 10-item PNK measure as the independent variable (IV). A significant model 
indicates that PNK does influence native advertising recognition [χ2 (1, 680) = 40.88, p < .001; 
Cox & Snell = .06, Nagelkerke = .11]. As shown in Table 1 (see Appendix C), even with 
controls for age, gender, education, income, ideology, frequency of news consumption, 
perceived credibility of the Times, priming, and native advertising context, the model was 
significant [χ2 (10, 671) = 69.59, p < .001; Cox & Snell = .10, Nagelkerke = .18]. The PNK 
coefficient (b = 0.38, β = 1.46; p < .001) indicates that greater knowledge of how the news media 
operate increased the odds of native ad recognition. A significant coefficient for native 
advertising context suggests the odds of recognizing the political native ad (Chevron) as 
advertising were greater than for the non-political ad (Cole Haan) (b = 0.67, β = 1.95; p < .001). 
More frequent news consumption also increased the odds of native ad recognition (b = 0.39, β = 
1.47; p < .05), as did a younger age (b = -0.01, β = 0.98; p < .05) and more liberal ideology (b = -
0.31, β = 0.73; p < .05). Thus, H1a is supported.  
For H1b, a second model using OLS regression with the perceived accuracy of fabricated 
news headlines as the DV and the 4-item PNK measure as the IV shows a significant relationship 
[F(1, 882) = 75.89, p < .001, r2 = .08]. As indicated in Table 2 (see Appendix C), even with 
controls for age, gender, education, ideology, interest in news and politics, and dummy variables 
for voting for Trump, Clinton, or another candidate in the 2016 presidential election, the model 
remains significant [F(9, 874) = 45.41, p < .001, r2 = .32]. The coefficient for PNK is significant 
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and negatively signed (β = - 0.19; p < .001), indicating that as PNK decreased, the perceived 
accuracy of the headlines increased. In addition, age also has an inverse relationship with 
perceived accuracy (β = - 0.07; p < .05), as does a liberal ideology (β = 0.25; p < .001), interest 
in news and politics (β = - 0.08; p < .05), and voting for Clinton (β = - 0.17; p < .001). Trump 
voters perceived the headlines as more accurate overall (β = 0.16; p < .001). Thus, the negative 
association between PNK and the perceived accuracy of fabricated news headlines supports H1b.  
 The second hypothesis (H2) predicted that PNK would be positively associated with 
native advertising threat perception. To test this prediction, an OLS regression model was 
specified with threat perception as the DV and the 10-item PNK measure as the IV. The model 
was significant [F(1, 676) = 14.62, p < .001, r2 = .02], indicating PNK is associated with the 
perceived threat of being confronted with native advertising. The model remained significant 
with controls added for age, gender, education, income, ideology, frequency of news 
consumption, perceived credibility of the Times, priming, and native advertising context [F(10, 
667) = 4.20, p < .001, r2 = .06]. A statistically significant coefficient for PNK indicates that 
higher levels of PNK correspond to greater threat perception (β = 0.11; p < .01). Furthermore, 
those who found the Times less credible were more likely to have higher levels of threat 
perception (β = - 0.15; p < .001), as were those who consumed news more frequently (β = 0.10; p 
< .05), and female respondents (β = 0.08; p < .05). H2 thus finds support. 
 The relationship between PNK and propensity to counterargue was the focus of H3. 
Because the outcome variable is overdispersed, we estimated a negative binomial regression 
model with the number of counterarguments related to the native advertising stimuli as the DV 
and the 10-item PNK measure as the IV. Controls were included for recognition of native 
advertising, age, gender, education, income, ideology, frequency of news consumption, 
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perceived credibility of the Times, priming, and native advertising context. A statistically 
significant model indicates that PNK influences the propensity to counterargue when confronted 
with native advertising [LR χ2 (11) = 61.18, p < .001, Pearson χ2 = 665.47, residual df = 668, 
dispersion statistic = 1.00]. A significant coefficient for PNK (b = 0.11, β = 1.12; p < .001) 
indicates that participants with greater levels of news knowledge were more likely to 
counterargue when viewing native advertising than participants who had less knowledge about 
news media operations. Female participants were also more likely to counterargue (b = 0.25, β = 
1.28; p < .001), as were those exposed to the political native ad (b = 0.20, β = 1.22; p < .05) and 
those who evaluated the Times as lower in credibility (b = - 0.09, β = 0.91; p < .001). These 
results support H3. 
The last hypothesis (H4) examines whether PNK confers resistance to persuasion. The 
first test of this prediction is among participants exposed to the native advertising stimulus. An 
OLS regression was estimated with the composite measure of persuasion as the DV and the 10-
item PNK measure as the IV. A significant model indicates that PNK affects the degree of 
persuasion [F(1, 677) = 63.13, p < .001, r2 = .09]. The model remained significant after adding 
controls for recognition of native advertising, age, gender, education, income, ideology, 
frequency of news consumption, perceived credibility of the Times, priming, and native 
advertising context [F(11, 667) = 18.91, p < .001, r2 = .24]. A negatively signed coefficient for 
PNK (β = -0.28; p < .001) indicates an inverse relationship between PNK and persuasion. That 
is, participants with lower levels of news knowledge found the native ad more persuasive than 
those with higher levels. A similar inverse relationship emerged for age (β = -0.22; p < .001), 
suggesting that younger participants found the stimulus more persuasive than older participants. 
Those who considered the Times more credible (β = 0.31; p < .001) and those who consumed 
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news more frequently (β = 0.12; p < .01) also found the stimulus more persuasive. These results 
support H4. 
A second test of H4 was performed on participants exposed to the news headlines. 
Another OLS regression was estimated with the 2-item social media engagement measure of 
persuasion as the DV and the 4-item PNK measure as the IV. A significant model indicates that 
PNK affects the degree of persuasion [F(1, 808) = 57.97, p < .001, r2 = .07]. Adding controls for 
age, gender, education, ideology, interest in news/politics, and dummy variables for voting in the 
2016 presidential election, the model remains significant [F(9, 800) = 20.05, p < .001, r2 = .18]. 
The coefficient for PNK is significant and negatively signed (β = - 0.25; p < .001), indicating 
that as PNK decreased, the likelihood of engaging with the news headlines on social media 
increased. Age (β = - 0.17; p < .001) and gender (β = - 0.07; p < .05) are inversely related, 
indicating that participants who were older males were less likely to engage with the headlines. 
Participants who reported voting for Trump in the 2016 election (β = 0.22; p < .001) and who 
expressed a greater interest in news and politics (β = 0.14; p < .001) were more likely to “like” 
and share the news headlines. Thus, there is strong support for H4. 
Discussion 
Despite polls finding that people are generally confident in their ability to recognize 
“fake news” (Barthel, Mitchell, & Holcomb, 2016), recent studies—at least among student 
populations—contradict these beliefs (Wineburg et al., 2016). The present study, among the first 
to investigate these questions in nationally distributed non-student populations, searched for 
evidence that PNK facilitates resistance to disinformation such as native advertising and 
fabricated news headlines. Consistent with past research on news media literacy more broadly 
(Vraga & Tully, 2016), our results show that news expertise significantly influences how 
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individuals evaluate online information. This was particularly true in political contexts. What 
divides individuals recognizing legitimate journalism from fabricated news and commercialized 
content is an understanding of how the news media operate. 
Empirical evidence of PNK as a dispositional antecedent that facilitates recognition of an 
attempt at influence is one contribution this study makes to the persuasion knowledge literature. 
Participants with greater levels of PNK were not only more likely to recognize native advertising 
and fabricated news headlines, they were also more cognitively resilient in their capacity to 
respond via counterarguments. In multiple tests, news knowledge was shown to facilitate 
resistance to suspect content. Our results show, moreover, that those with greater levels of PNK 
experienced higher levels of perceived threat over the prospect of encountering disinformation, 
lending theoretical support to the inoculation-conferring properties of media knowledge holding. 
Though developed for health-related contexts (McGuire, 1964), inoculation theory can be 
gainfully applied to address questionable content masquerading as news.  
As with other types of media literacy, PNK is not an explicit forewarning mechanism as 
is commonly employed in the inoculation literature (e.g., Compton & Ivanov, 2012). Rather, it 
appears to function as an implicit forewarning mechanism, or cognitive resource, against 
different forms of covert persuasion and media disinformation. The analysis here positioned 
PNK as an antecedent or dispositional variable in place well before exposure to disinformation. 
As a structure in long term memory, PNK likely develops over time through a lengthy process of 
informal media socialization and (at least among some students and industry professionals) more 
formal news training. Ongoing applied research efforts such as those sponsored by the American 
Press Institute (Rosenstiel & Elizabeth, 2018) seem to be converging around the idea that 
explicitly describing the editorial process to news audiences—teaching them while informing— 
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is key to building news fluency and regaining media trust. Fundamentally, such efforts are driven 
by a shared conviction about the value of PNK to news audiences.  
As with any research, certain limitations need acknowledgement. First, our data relied 
on survey evidence rather than an experimental design, so strong causal inferences would be 
premature. Further research using factorial designs would strengthen the case for these effects. 
Direct comparisons of how PNK performs relative to other dimensions of the broader news 
media literacy construct would also add to this study’s findings. With the influence of PNK in 
resisting disinformation established, different message characteristics could be explored to assess 
which types of news content or ways of presenting news facilitate or undermine resistance at 
varying levels of news knowledge. Subsequent research might also investigate the extent to 
which PNK is enduring or subject to decay, particularly if knowledge about the press was 
recently acquired, and how much news knowledge needs to be attained for PNK to have salutary 
effects.  
Even so, the findings reported here should be welcome news for media educators, 
researchers, and policy makers concerned with the public’s ability to contend with digital 
disinformation and suggest that additional educational campaigns to inform citizens about 
mainstream news media operations could yield significant benefits. Although this study can only 
be regarded as an initial demonstration of PNK’s inoculating influence, the results show 
cognitive and informational benefits from possessing working knowledge of mainstream media 
operations in both the identification of fabricated news and mitigation of covert persuasion. 
Among other benefits, holding a high level of PNK functions as a vital resource protecting the 
individual from the almost daily “bullshit tornados” (Jacobs, 2017) increasingly swirling about 
the contemporary news landscape.   
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Figure 1. Native Advertising Treatment Stimuli (political vs. non-political) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Rather than static screen shots, participants viewed live webpages, both of which were 
interactive in nature.  
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Supplemental Files 
 
Appendix A: Procedural News Knowledge Questions 
 
Q1. In what section does a newspaper's editorial staff endorse candidates and express their 
opinions about current issues? 
o On the front page (15.4%)  
o On the editorial page (61.7%)  
o In the business section (4.8%)  
o In a special weekly advertising section (5.0%)  
o Mainstream newspapers don't endorse candidates or take issue stands (13.1%)  
 
Q2. How long is a typical nightly newscast on the three main broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, 
and NBC)? 
o 15 minutes (5.4%)  
o 30 minutes (54.1%)  
o 1 hour (36.6%)  
o 90 minutes (2.4%)  
o 2 hours (1.6%)  
 
Q3. Do television anchors generally go out and report news stories on their own, or do they 
mostly present stories that others produce for them? 
o Mostly report stories on their own (10.6%)  
o Mostly report stories that others produce for them (63.2%)  
o Equally report on their own and present stories that others produce for them (26.2%)  
 
Q4. Which of the following newspapers is generally regarded as the national "newspaper of 
record," providing a "first draft” of history?  
o USA Today (19.8%)  
o The Chicago Tribune (3.9%)  
o The New York Times (43.9%)  
o The Washington Post (29.4%)  
o The Los Angeles Times (2.9%)  
 
Q5. Which of the following best describes a press release? 
o A short news piece written or produced by a reporter (17.2%)  
o A written statement or short video about a newsworthy event given out to reporters by an 
official or public relations specialist (69.1%)  
o An opinion piece written by a syndicated columnist (8.0%)  
o A paid advertisement that appears in newspapers and on news websites with the label 
"paid advertisement" (5.8%)  
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Q6. Most news websites prioritize the stories and columns that are most popular, or trending, 
with users rather than simply structure the news page according to what the editors think are the 
most important stories.  
o True (84.3%)  
o False (15.7%)  
 
Q7. The most important information in a news story generally appears at what point in the story? 
o In the first paragraph, in what is traditionally called the "lead" (67.0%)  
o In the third paragraph, after the introduction to the story, in what is traditionally called 
the "nut graf" (11.4%)  
o At the maximum narrative arc of the story, where the writer decides it should be (14.0%)  
o At the end of the story, in the form of a summary (7.7%)  
 
Q8. Most media outlets in the United States are: 
o For-profit businesses (66.9%)  
o Owned by the government (7.8%)  
o Non-profit businesses (7.6%)  
o Don't know (17.7%)  
 
Q9. Which of the following U.S. news outlets does NOT depend primarily on advertising for 
financial support? 
o FOX News (9.4%)  
o PBS (52.4%)  
o The New York Times (5.7%)  
o Time Magazine (3.5%)  
o Don't know (28.9%)  
 
Q10. When it comes to reporting the news, the main difference between websites like Google 
News and a website like CNN.com is that: 
o Google doesn't have reporters who gather information, while CNN does. (40.3%)  
o Google focuses on national news, while CNN focuses on local news. (6.3%)  
o Google has more editors than CNN does. (5.7%)  
o Google charges money for the news, while CNN does not. (4.2%)  
o Don't know (43.5%)  
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Appendix B: News Headline Questions 
 
To the best of your knowledge, how accurate is the following story [RANDOMIZE]: 
 
Not at all accurate = 1 Not very accurate = 2 Somewhat accurate = 3 Very accurate = 4 
 
Q1. Pope Francis endorsed Donald Trump for president during the 2016 presidential campaign. 
[FALSE] 
 
Q2. In the summer of 2018, President Donald Trump donated his entire $400,000 annual salary 
for rebuilding military cemeteries. [FALSE] 
 
Q3. Before Colin Kaepernick became famous for kneeling at NFL games, former quarterback 
Tim Tebow took a knee during the National Anthem before playing in a Denver Bronco’s game 
to protest the right of women to an abortion. [FALSE] 
 
Q4. During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Donald Trump sent his own plane to the Middle East 
to transport 200 Marines who had become stranded. [FALSE]  
 
Q5. During the 2016 presidential campaign, an FBI agent suspected in Hillary Clinton’s email 
leaks was found dead in an apparent murder-suicide. [FALSE] 
 
Q6. In February 2017, President Trump reversed an Obama-era regulation that made it easier to 
block the sale of firearms to people with mental illnesses. [TRUE]  
 
Q7. During his first 100 days in office, President Trump made, on average, 4.9 false or 
misleading claims a day, according to the Washington Post; now he averages over 7.5 false or 
misleading claims a day. [TRUE] 
 
Q8. In an address to the United Nations in September 2018, President Trump bragged to 
assembled diplomats that, “In less than two years, my [presidential] administration has 
accomplished more than almost any administration in the history of our country.” World leaders 
assembled for his speech laughed in response. [TRUE] 
 
Q9. After his summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018, President 
Trump said that some of North Korea’s beaches could make great locations for condos, and that 
“you could have the best hotels in the world right there.” [TRUE] 
 
Q10. After his visit to North Korea, President Trump was shown in a propaganda video saluting 
a North Korean general – footage, according to news analysts, that will likely be used by the 
regime as “proof” that the American president defers to the North Korean military. [TRUE] 
 
Note: Based upon procedures by Pennycook, G., & Rand D.G. (2018). Lazy, not biased: 
Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated 
reasoning. Cognition. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011.   
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Appendix C: Regression Tables 
Table 1. Binomial Logistic Regression of Procedural News Knowledge Predicting Native 
Advertising Recognition 
 
  Native Advertising 
  b (SE) β 
Procedural News Knowledge+    0.38 (0.07)***   1.46 
Age  - 0.01 (0.01)*   0.98 
Female    0.42 (0.25)   1.52 
Education    0.11 (0.09)   1.12 
Ideology  - 0.31 (0.02)**   0.73 
Income  - 0.01 (0.05)   0.99 
News consumption    0.39 (0.19)*   1.47 
NYT credibility  - 0.03 (0.08)   0.97 
Priming  - 0.09 (0.36)   0.92 
NA context    0.67 (0.25)**   1.95 
Constant  - 6.09 (1.42)  
X2  69.59  
Nagelkerke R2      .18  
N  681  
Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +10-item measure; Ideology: 1 = very liberal, 5 = very 
conservative 
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Table 2. OLS Regression of Procedural News Knowledge and Perceived Accuracy of Fabricated 
Fake News Headlines 
  News Headlines 
  b (SE) β 
Procedural News Knowledge+  - 0.08 (0.01)*** - 0.19 
Age  - 0.02 (0.01)* - 0.07 
Female    0.01 (0.03)   0.01 
Education  - 0.01 (0.01) - 0.02 
Ideology    0.10 (0.01)***   0.25 
News/political interest  - 0.02 (0.01)** - 0.08 
Trump voter    0.15 (0.04)***   0.16 
Clinton voter  - 0.16 (0.04)*** - 0.17 
Other voter  - 0.11 (0.06) - 0.06 
Constant    2.29 (0.08)  
F  45.41  
R2      .32  
N  883  
Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +4-item measure; Ideology: 1 = very liberal, 5 = very 
conservative 
 
 
 
 
